Gambling in contests with random initial law by Feng, Han & Hobson, David
ar
X
iv
:1
40
5.
78
01
v2
  [
q-
fin
.E
C]
  4
 Fe
b 2
01
6
The Annals of Applied Probability
2016, Vol. 26, No. 1, 186–215
DOI: 10.1214/14-AAP1088
c© Institute of Mathematical Statistics, 2016
GAMBLING IN CONTESTS WITH RANDOM INITIAL LAW
By Han Feng and David Hobson
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This paper studies a variant of the contest model introduced in
Seel and Strack [J. Econom. Theory 148 (2013) 2033–2048]. In the
Seel–Strack contest, each agent or contestant privately observes a
Brownian motion, absorbed at zero, and chooses when to stop it.
The winner of the contest is the agent who stops at the highest value.
The model assumes that all the processes start from a common value
x0 > 0 and the symmetric Nash equilibrium is for each agent to utilise
a stopping rule which yields a randomised value for the stopped pro-
cess. In the two-player contest, this randomised value has a uniform
distribution on [0,2x0].
In this paper, we consider a variant of the problem whereby the
starting values of the Brownian motions are independent, nonnegative
random variables that have a common law µ. We consider a two-
player contest and prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric
Nash equilibrium for the problem. The solution is that each agent
should aim for the target law ν, where ν is greater than or equal
to µ in convex order; ν has an atom at zero of the same size as
any atom of µ at zero, and otherwise is atom free; on (0,∞) ν has
a decreasing density; and the density of ν only decreases at points
where the convex order constraint is binding.
1. Introduction. Seel and Strack (2013) introduced a contest model in
which each agent chooses a stopping rule to stop a privately observed stochas-
tic process. The contestant who stops her process at the highest value wins a
prize. The objective of each agent is not to maximise the expected stopping
value, but rather to maximise the probability that her stopping value is the
highest amongst the set of stopping values of all the contestants.
The Seel–Strack contest is a stylised model of a contest between agents
in which agents compete to win a single prize. Examples include certain
internet casino games (where competitors ante a fixed amount, then play
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independently with notional funds, with the prize awarded to the contestant
with the highest notional fortune at the end of the game), competitions
between fund managers (where each manager aims to outperform all the
others in order to obtain more funds to invest over the next time period) and
competitions between company CEOs (only the most successful of whom,
in relative terms, will be offered an executive position at a larger company);
see Seel and Strack (2013) for further details and examples. The key feature
of these contests is that the cost in terms of effort is not dependent on the
riskiness of the strategy, and that agents do not earn rewards from the value
of their entry into the contest, but only from the relative value or rank order
of the entry.
The modelling assumptions of Seel and Strack (2013) include the fact that
contestants are unable to observe both the realisations and the stopping
times of their rivals and the fact that the privately observed stochastic pro-
cesses are independent realisations of a drifting Brownian motion absorbed
at zero. As argued by Feng and Hobson (2015), the setting can be generalised
to allow for independent realisations of any nonnegative, time-homogeneous
diffusion process since a change of scale and time reduces the problem to
the martingale case of Brownian motion without drift. Henceforth, we will
concentrate on the case of drift-free Brownian motion, absorbed at zero. We
will focus on the two-player case.
Seel and Strack (2013) studied the symmetric case where the contestants
observe processes which all start from the same strictly positive constant.
In this paper, we will discuss an extension of the Seel–Strack problem to
randomised initial values, whereby the starting values of the Brownian mo-
tions are drawn independently from the (commonly known) distribution µ,
where µ is any integrable probability measure on R+. This might correspond
to casino gamblers who are obliged to participate in a minimum number of
bets before closing out their position, fund managers with different initial
portfolios (which are unknown to competing agents) or to newly installed
CEOs taking positions in companies of different strengths.
A very attractive feature of the Seel–Strack contest model is that it has
an explicit symmetric Nash equilibrium, as constructed in Seel and Strack
(2013). Stopping rules are identified with target laws for the entry into the
contest and in equilibrium players use randomised strategies, so that the
level at which the player should stop is stochastic. Moreover, the set of
values at which the agent should stop forms an interval which is bounded
above. In the two-player case, the target law is a uniform distribution (so
that if the initial wealth of both agents is x then the target law has con-
stant density 1/2x on [0,2x]); see Example 3.1 below. Our results extend
Seel and Strack (2013) to the case where the initial values of the Brown-
ian motions are independent draws from a common initial law. As in the
Seel–Strack contest, stopping rules are identified with target laws, and in
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equilibrium players use randomised strategies, so that the level at which the
player should stop is stochastic. Now, however, the set of values at which the
agent should stop forms an interval which can be unbounded above (if the
initial law has unbounded support). Since terminal laws are obtained from
stopping a nonnegative martingale, it is clear that any attainable terminal
law has a mean which is equal to or less than the mean of the initial law,
and it is natural to expect that an optimal terminal law has highest mean
possible, or equivalently we expect that for an optimal stopping rule the
mean of the terminal law should equal that of the initial law. Then the can-
didate terminal laws are precisely those which are greater than or equal to
the initial law in convex order. In fact, we show that the optimal law has the
twin properties that (with the possible exception of an atom at zero of the
same size as the inital law) the target law has a density which is decreasing,
and the density decreases only at those levels where the convex order con-
straint, expressed via the potential of the distributions, is binding. We have
two main results: first, we show that any distribution with these properties
characterises a symmetric Nash equilibrium for the problem (Theorem 3.1);
and second we show that for any initial law there is exactly one target law
with these properties (Theorem 3.2), and hence there is a unique symmetric
Nash equilibrium for the problem.
The Seel–Strack contest is a recent addition to the literature in economics
and has not yet been greatly studied. However, as Seel and Strack (2013)
emphasise, there are strong connections between their contest model and
all-pay auctions [see, e.g., Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996)], wars of
attrition [Hendricks, Weiss and Wilson (1988)] and silent timing games [Park
and Smith (2008)]. Indeed in the setting of n exchangeable agents with
fixed initial wealth (equal to 1/n), the solution of the Seel–Strack contest
is identical to that of n-agents in an all-pay auction with cost equal to
bid size. In both situations, agents randomise their strategy in order to
introduce uncertainty into the value they enter into the contest/auction.
This makes it more difficult (and in equilibrium, impossible) for opponents
to take advantage of knowledge of the distribution of the entry. If in the two-
player Seel–Strack contest an agent chooses an entry which is a point mass
(at the initial wealth x), then the opponent can play until his wealth is x+ ε
or he goes bankrupt; thus winning the contest with probability x/(x+ ε).
Since ε can be chosen arbitrarily the opponent can choose a strategy for
which the probability of him winning is arbitrarily close to unity, and thus
the strategy of the first player cannot be optimal.
In contrast to the Seel–Strack contest, the all-pay auction is much studied.
The all-pay auction is used as a model of technological competition, political
lobbying and job promotion (with effort). Several generalisations of the all-
pay auction have been studied. Sometimes in these auctions one or more
of the agents has a headstart [Konrad (2002)], perhaps from prior effort,
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or from being the incumbent in an election campaign. In recent work, Seel
(2014) studies the all-pay auction with random head starts, which is the
direct analogue of the problem studied here. Seel finds the Nash equilibrium
in an asymmetric, two player all-pay auction where one of the players has
a random headstart, and the ideas can be extended to the symmetric case
where both players have random headstarts.
Relative to the main results of Seel (2014) on all-pay auctions with random
headstarts, we find that the symmetric Nash equilibrium in the Seel–Strack
contest with random initial law is more subtle. In the symmetric two-player
all-pay auction with random headstart, the target law for the total bid has
a density taking values in {0,1}. In particular, there may be gaps in the
support of the distribution. In contrast, in the symmetric two-player Seel–
Strack contest with random initial law, we find that the support of the
target law has no holes, and that the density is monotonic decreasing. This
indicates that the Seel–Strack contest and the all-pay auction are perhaps
less closely linked than might be expected from considering the base case
alone. In the case without headstarts/with point mass initial law, the Nash
equlibria in the two settings are identical, but this does not carry over to
generalisations of the two problems. Even in the standard setting we learn
that the fundamental property of the uniform distribution which leads to
optimality in the two-player Seel–Strack contest is that it has a decreasing
density, whereas in the context of the all-pay auction it is the fact that the
uniform distribution has a density which takes values in {0,1}.
Seel and Strack (2013) solved their problem by proposing a candidate
value function for the problem, and then verifying that this candidate is
a martingale under an optimal stopping rule for each agent. We solve the
problem in a different way using a Lagrangian approach. Our solution meth-
ods allow us to characterise the target laws which correspond to a candidate
equilibrium quite easily, but some effort is required to show that there is
a measure with these characteristics, and that for a given initial law, this
measure is unique.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the math-
ematical model of the contest. We will see that a Nash equilibrium is iden-
tified with a pair of probability measures. In Section 3, we state the main
theorems which characterise the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium and
give some examples. A proof of the characterisation theorem is given in
Section 4. Following some preliminary results in Section 5, which are po-
tentially of independent interest, Section 6 includes an explicit construction
of the symmetric Nash equilibrium in the case where the starting random
variable takes only a finite number of distinct values, and then an extension
of the existence result to general measures. Uniqueness of the equilibrium is
proved in Section 7.
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2. The model. Consider a contest between two agents. Agent i ∈ {1,2}
privately observes the continuous-time realisation of a Brownian motion
Xi = (Xit)t∈R+ absorbed at zero, where the processes Xi are independent.
Seel and Strack assume Xi0 = x0 for some positive real number x0 which
does not depend on i. The innovation in this paper is that we assume
Xi0 ∼ µ, where µ is the law of a nonnegative random variable with finite
mean µ ∈ (0,∞). The values of (Xi0)i=1,2 are assumed to be independent
draws from the law µ.
Let F it = σ({Xis : s ≤ t}) and set Fi = (F it )t≥0. A strategy of agent i is a
F
i-stopping time τ i. Since zero is absorbing for Xi, without loss of generality
we may restrict attention to τ i ≤H i0 = inf{t≥ 0 :Xit = 0}. Both the process
Xi and the stopping time τ i are private information to agent i. That is, Xi
and τ i cannot be observed by the other agent.
The agent who stops at the highest value wins a prize, which we normalise
to one without loss of generality. In the case of a tie in which both agents
stop at the equal highest value, we assume that each of them wins θ, where
θ ∈ [0,1). Therefore, player i with stopping value Xi
τ i
receives payoff
1{Xi
τi
>X3−i
τ3−i
} + θ1{Xi
τi
=X3−i
τ3−i
}.
Seel and Strack (2013) observed that since the payoffs to the agents only
depend upon τ i via the distribution of Xi
τ i
, the problem of choosing the
optimal stopping time τ i can be reduced to a problem of finding the optimal
distribution ofXi
τ i
or equivalently an optimal target law. Once we have found
the optimal target law νi, the remaining work is to verify that there exists
τ i such that Xiτ i ∼ νi. This is the classical Skorokhod embedding problem
[Skorokhod (1965)] for which solutions are well known [see Ob lo´j (2004) and
Hobson (2011) for surveys]. Note that there are typically multiple solutions
to the embedding problem for a given target law, and any of these solutions
can be used to construct an optimal stopping rule. We will identify a solution
with the distribution of Xiτ i , rather than with the stopping rule itself, so that
when we talk about a unique equilibrium the uniqueness will refer to the
target distribution and not to the stopping rule.
We now introduce some notation which will be used throughout the paper.
Let M be the set of integrable measures on R+ = [0,∞) with finite total
mass, and let P be the subset of M consisting of integrable probability
measures on R+. Let δx ∈ P be the unit mass at x and let ̺x ∈ P be the
uniform distribution on [0,2x] (with mean x).
For ̟ ∈M, let ̟ = ∫∞0 x̟(dx), and define the right-continuous distribu-
tion function F̟ : [0,∞) 7→ [0,̟(R+)] by F̟(x) =̟([0, x]). In the sequel,
we occasionally want to consider F̟ as a function on (−∞,∞) in which
case we set F̟(x) = 0 for x < 0. Define also the call and put price functions
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C̟ : [0,∞) 7→ [0,̟] and P̟ : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞) by
C̟(x) =
∫ ∞
x
(y − x)̟(dy) =
∫ ∞
x
(̟(R+)−F̟(y))dy,
P̟(x) =
∫ x
0
(x− y)̟(dy) =
∫ x
0
F̟(y)dy.
Note that C̟(x)−P̟(x) =
∫∞
0 y̟(dy)−x
∫∞
0 ̟(dy) =̟−x̟(R+) and if
χ ∈M and if ̟(R+) = χ(R+) then
lim
x↑∞
(P̟(x)−Pχ(x))
= lim
x↑∞
(P̟(x)− x̟(R+))− lim
x↑∞
(Pχ(x)− xχ(R+))(1)
= χ−̟.
Then χ is less than or equal to ̟ in convex order (written χcx ̟) if and
only if χ(R+) =̟(R+), χ=̟ and Cχ(x) ≤ C̟(x) for all x≥ 0. This last
condition can be rewritten in terms of puts as Pχ(x)≤ P̟(x) for all x≥ 0.
Note that if χcx ̟, then Cχ(0) =C̟(0) and χ({0}) = Fχ(0) = χ(R+)+
C ′χ(0+)≤̟(R+) +C ′̟ (0+) = F̟(0) =̟({0}).
Suppose χ,̟ ∈ P , then it is well known [see, e.g., Chacon and Walsh
(1976)] that for Brownian motion X with X0 ∼ χ, there exists a stopping
time τ for which (Xt∧τ )t≥0 is uniformly integrable and Xτ ∼̟ if and only
if χcx ̟. In our context, we do not necessarily want to insist on uniform
integrability, but rather that the stopping time occurs before the first hit of
X on zero.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose χ,̟ ∈ P. Let X be a Brownian motion absorbed
at zero with initial law χ. Then there exists a stopping time τ with Xτ ∼̟
if and only if Pχ(x)≤ P̟(x) for all x≥ 0.
Proof. Since (Xt∧H0)t≥0 is a nonnegative supermartingale, by a con-
ditional version of Jensen’s inequality,
E[(x−Xτ )+|F0]≥ (x− E[Xτ |F0])+ ≥ (x−X0)+
and then
Pτ (x) = E[(x−Xτ )+] = E[E[(x−Xτ )+|F0]]≥ E[(x−X0)+] = Pχ(x).
Conversely, the existence follows from results of Rost (1971). 
Definition 2.1. Given µ ∈M, we say that ν ∈M is weakly admissible
(with respect to µ) if ν(R+) = µ(R+) and Pν(x)≥ Pµ(x) for all x≥ 0.
We say that ν is strongly admissible (with respect to µ) if ν is weakly
admissible and ν = µ.
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Note that if ν is weakly admissible then necessarily ν({0})≥ µ({0}) and
ν ≤ µ by (1). If ν is strongly admissible, then µcx ν.
These definitions are motivated by the fact that if X is Brownian motion
with X0 ∼ µ ∈ P and if ν ∈ P is weakly admissible with respect to µ then
there exists τ ≤ H0 := inf{u > 0 :Xu = 0} such that Xτ ∼ ν, and if ν is
strongly admissible then there exists τ such that Xτ ∼ ν and (Xt∧τ )t≥0 is
uniformly integrable.
Definition 2.2. The pair of weakly admissible measures (ν1, ν2) with
νi ∈ P forms a Nash equilibrium if, for each i ∈ {1,2}, given that the other
agent j = 3− i uses a stopping rule τ j such that Xj
τ j
∼ νj , then any stopping
rule τ i such that Xi
τ i
∼ νi is optimal.
If (ν, ν) forms a Nash equilibrium, then the equilibrium is symmetric.
A Nash equilibrium may be characterised as follows. Let V iχ,̟ denote the
value of the game to player i if Player 1 uses a stopping rule which yields
law χ for X1τ1 and Player 2 uses a stopping rule which yields law ̟ for X
2
τ2 .
It follows that
V 1χ,̟ =
∫
[0,∞)
χ(dx){F̟(x−) + θ(F̟(x)− F̟(x−))},
V 2χ,̟ =
∫
[0,∞)
̟(dx){Fχ(x−) + θ(Fχ(x)−Fχ(x−))}.
Then (σ, ν) is a Nash equilibrium if V 1σ,ν = supπ V
1
π,ν and V
2
σ,ν = supπ V
2
σ,π,
where the suprema are taken over the set of weakly admissible measures.
A symmetric Nash equilibrium is a weakly admissible measure ν such that
V 1ν,ν = supπ V
1
π,ν and V
2
ν,ν = supπ V
2
ν,π, where again the supremum is taken
over weakly admissible measures π. Note that since V 1χ,̟ = V
2
̟,χ the defi-
nition can be simplified to a symmetric Nash equilibrium is a weakly ad-
missible measure ν such that V 1ν,ν = supπ V
1
π,ν from which is follows that
supπ V
2
ν,π = supπ V
1
π,ν = V
1
ν,ν = V
2
ν,ν and ν is also optimal for Player 2.
Our paper investigates the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash
equilibrium. It seems natural that a Nash equilibrium is symmetric, since
the contest is symmetric in the sense that each agent observes a martingale
process started from the same law µ. Then simple arguments over rearrang-
ing mass can be used to show that it is never optimal for two agents to put
mass at the same positive point x, and further that any symmetric Nash
equilibrium must be strongly admissible. The proof of Theorem 2.1 is in the
Appendix.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose (ν, ν) is a Nash equilibrium. Then ν is strongly
admissible, Fν(x) is continuous on (0,∞) and Fν(0) = Fµ(0).
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3. Main results and examples. In this section, we describe the main
results concerning existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium
for the contest, and give examples.
Definition 3.1. Suppose µ ∈M. Let A∗µ ⊆M be the set of measures
ν satisfying:
(i) ν(R+) = µ(R+), Fν(0) = Fµ(0), Fν is continuous on (0,∞), ν = µ,
and Cν(x)≥Cµ(x) for all x≥ 0;
(ii) Fν(x) is concave on [0,∞);
(iii) if Cν(x)>Cµ(x) on some interval J ⊂ [0,∞) then Fν(x) is linear on
J .
The two main results in this article are a theorem which characterises
symmetric Nash equilibria, and a theorem which proves that a symmetric
Nash equilibrium exists and is unique.
Theorem 3.1. If µ ∈ P, then (ν∗, ν∗) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium
for the problem if and only if ν∗ ∈A∗µ.
Theorem 3.2. For µ ∈M, |A∗µ|= 1. In particular, if µ ∈ P then there
exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium for the problem.
Before proving Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, we present some examples.
Example 3.1. Recall that ̺x = U [0,2x], where U stands for the con-
tinuous uniform distribution. Suppose µ ∈ P satisfies Cµ ≤ C̺µ . Then it is
easy to see that ̺µ ∈ A∗µ, and thus (̺µ, ̺µ) is the unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium for the problem. In the case µ= δ0, this is the Seel and Strack
(2013) result.
Example 3.2. Suppose µ ∈ P is atom-free, except perhaps for an atom
at zero. Set bµ = sup{x :Fµ(x)< 1}. If Fµ is concave on [0, bµ], then µ ∈A∗µ
and (µ,µ) is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium for the problem. If Fµ
is convex on [0, bµ] and Fµ(0) = 0, then it can be verified that Cµ ≤ C̺µ
(see Proposition 5.1 for a detailed proof), and thus (̺µ, ̺µ) is the unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium for the problem.
Example 3.3 (Beta distribution). Suppose µ is a Beta distribution
on [0,1] with shape parameters α = 2 and β = 3, that is µ = Beta(2,3).
Then, the mean of µ is 2/5, Cµ(x) = (
3
5x
5 − 2x4 + 2x3 − x+ 25)1{x≤1}, and
Fµ(x) = min{3x4−8x3+6x2,1}. Then Fµ(x) is convex on (0, 13) and concave
on (13 ,1), or equivalently the density fµ = F
′
µ is increasing on [0,1/3] and
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decreasing on [1/3,1]. Hence, µ itself is not a candidate Nash equilibrium.
Instead we expect to find a symmetric Nash equilibrium ν with a constant
density fν(x) = 2c1 on [0, c2], and fν(x) = fµ(x) on [c2,1], where c1 and c2
are constants to be determined. Since ν has constant density 2c1 on [0, c2] it
follows that Cν(x) = c1x
2 − x+ 25 on this interval. Moreover, c1 and c2 sat-
isfy Cµ(c2) =Cν(c2) = c1c
2
2−c2+ 25 and C ′µ(c2) =C ′ν(c2) = 2c1c2−1. Solving
the system of equations, we obtain c1 =
4
√
10+140
243 and c2 =
10−√10
9 . For this
choice of c1, c2 it follows that ν ∈ A∗µ. Thus, (ν, ν) is the unique symmetric
Nash equilibrium for the problem.
Example 3.4 (Atomic measure). Suppose that µ= 12δ1−ε+
1
2δ1+ε, where
ε ∈ (0,1). Then
Cµ(x) = (1− x) · 1x∈[0,1−ε) + 12(1 + ε− x) · 1x∈[1−ε,1+ε).
Suppose ε ∈ (0,1/2]. Then Cµ ≤C̺1 , where ̺1 = U [0,2], and then (̺1, ̺1)
is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium for the problem.
Now suppose ε ∈ (1/2,1). Define the function C by
C(x) =
x2 − 8(1− ε)(x− 1)
8(1− ε) · 1x∈[0,2(1−ε)) +
x2 − 8εx+16ε2
8(3ε− 1) · 1x∈[2(1−ε),4ε),
and let ν be given by Cν(x) =C(x). Then ν ∈A∗µ. Hence, (ν, ν) is the unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium for the problem if ε ∈ (1/2,1).
4. Sufficiency.
Proof of reverse implication of Theorem 3.1. We show that if
µ ∈ P and ν ∈ A∗µ then (ν, ν) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium. The state-
ment that if (ν, ν) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium then ν ∈A∗µ is given in
the Appendix.
Given µ ∈ P , define the classes of measures Awµ = {ν ∈M, ν weakly ad-
missible with respect to µ} and Asµ = {ν ∈M, ν strongly admissible with
respect to µ}. Recall also the definition of A∗µ in (3.1).
Using the properties of Theorem 2.1 we find that a symmetric Nash equi-
librium is identified with a measure ν∗ ∈Asµ with the property that, for any
ν ∈Awµ , V 1ν∗,ν∗ ≥ V 1ν,ν∗ . Since again by Theorem 2.1 we have that ν∗ has no
atoms on (0,∞), for a symmetric Nash equilibrium we must have that for
any ν ∈Awµ ∫
(0,∞)
Fν∗(x)ν
∗(dx) + θFν∗(0)Fν∗(0)
(2)
≥
∫
(0,∞)
Fν∗(x)ν(dx) + θFν∗(0)Fν(0).
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Fix ν∗ ∈ A∗µ and suppose ν ∈ M. Suppose that λ, γ and ζ are finite
constants and η is a measure on (0,∞), and suppose λ and ζ are nonnegative.
Define
Lν∗(ν;λ,γ, ζ, η)
=
∫
(0,∞)
Fν∗(x)ν(dx) + θFν∗(0)Fν(0) + λ
(
µ−
∫
(0,∞)
xν(dx)
)
+ γ
(
1−
∫
(0,∞)
ν(dx)− Fν(0)
)
+ ζ(Fν(0)−Fµ(0))
+
∫
(0,∞)
(Pν(z)−Pµ(z))η(dz)(3)
=
∫
(0,∞)
(
Fν∗(x)− λx− γ +
∫
(x,∞)
(z − x)η(dz)
)
ν(dx)
+
(
θFν∗(0)− γ + ζ +
∫
(0,∞)
zη(dz)
)
Fν(0)
+ λµ+ γ −
∫
(0,∞)
Pµ(z)η(dz)− ζFµ(0),(4)
where we use∫
(0,∞)
Pν(z)η(dz) =
∫
(0,∞)
η(dz)
[
zν({0}) +
∫
(0,z)
(z − x)ν(dx)
]
= Fν(0)
∫
(0,∞)
zη(dz) +
∫
(0,∞)
ν(dx)
∫
(x,∞)
(z − x)η(dz).
Equivalently, we have∫
(0,∞)
Fν∗(x)ν(dx) + θFν∗(0)Fν(0)
= Lν∗(ν;λ,γ, ζ, η)− λ(µ− ν)− γ(1− ν(R+))− ζ(Fν(0)−Fµ(0))
−
∫
(0,∞)
(Pν(z)−Pµ(z))η(dz).
Now suppose ν ∈ Awµ . Then since λ ≥ 0, ζ ≥ 0 and η(dz) ≥ 0 and since
ν ∈ Awµ implies that ν(R+) = µ(R+) = 1, Fν(0) ≥ Fµ(0) and Pν(z) ≥ Pµ(z)
∀z ≥ 0, we find∫
(0,∞)
Fν∗(x)ν(dx) + θFν∗(0)Fν(0)≤Lν∗(ν;λ,γ, ζ, η).(5)
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Furthermore, if η is such that η(J ) = 0 for every interval J for which
Pν∗(z) > Pµ(z) on J , then since ν∗ has unit mass and mean µ and since
Fν∗(0) = Fµ(0),∫
(0,∞)
Fν∗(x)ν
∗(dx) + θFν∗(0)Fν∗(0) = Lν∗(ν∗;λ,γ, ζ, η).(6)
Define b∗ = sup{x :Fν∗(x) < 1} so that b∗ ≤∞. Since Fν∗ is continuous
and concave, it is absolutely continuous, which means that there exists a
function fν∗ such that Fν∗(x) =
∫ x
0 fν∗(y)dy + Fν∗(0). By concavity of Fν∗ ,
fν∗ is monotonic and we may take it to be right-continuous. Then fν∗(x) =∫
(x,b∗]ψ(dz), where the measure ψ is given by ψ((z1, z2]) = fν∗(z1)− fν∗(z2)
for any z1 < z2.
Let λ∗ = 0, γ∗ = 1, ζ∗ = (1− θ)Fν∗(0) and η∗ = ψ. Then
∫
(0,∞) zη
∗(dz) =
1 − Fν∗(0). Since ν∗ ∈ A∗µ we have that if η∗ places mass on every neigh-
bourhood of x then Pν∗(x) = Pµ(x).
Define Γ on [0,∞) by Γ(x) = λ∗x+ γ∗ − ∫(x,∞)(z − x)η∗(dz). Then, for
any x > 0,
Γ(x) = 1−
∫
(x,∞)
ψ(dz)
∫ z
x
dy = 1−
∫ ∞
x
dy fν∗(y) = Fν∗(x).
Observe that θFν∗(0)− γ∗ + ζ∗ +
∫
(0,∞) zη
∗(dz) = 0. Thus, by (5) and (4),
for ν ∈Awν , ∫
(0,∞)
Fν∗(x)ν(dx) + θFν∗(0)Fν(0)
(7)
≤ λ∗µ+ γ∗ −
∫
(0,∞)
Pµ(z)η
∗(dz)− ζ∗Fµ(0),
and by (6) and (4),∫
(0,∞)
Fν∗(x)ν
∗(dx) + θFν∗(0)Fν∗(0)
(8)
= λ∗µ+ γ∗ −
∫
(0,∞)
Pµ(z)η
∗(dz)− ζ∗Fµ(0).
Note
∫
(0,∞) Pµ(z)η
∗(dz) =
∫
(0,b∗]Pν∗(z)ψ(dz) =
∫
(0,b∗] fν∗(z)Fν∗(z)dz = (1−
Fν∗(0)
2)/2< 1 so that the right-hand side of (7) and (8) is well defined and
positive. Furthermore, for any ν ∈Awµ ,∫
(0,∞)
Fν∗(x)ν(dx) + θFν∗(0)Fν(0)≤
∫
(0,∞)
Fν∗(x)ν
∗(dx) + θFν∗(0)Fν∗(0).
Hence, (ν∗, ν∗) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium for the problem. 
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Remark 4.1. Substituting for the values of the optimal Lagrange mul-
tipliers, we find
V 1ν∗,ν∗ =
∫
(0,∞)
Fν∗(x)ν
∗(dx) + θFν∗(0)Fν∗(0)
= 1− (1− θ)Fν∗(0)Fµ(0)− 1
2
(1−Fν∗(0)2)
=
1
2
+
(
θ− 1
2
)
Fµ(0)
2.
Note that this is as expected, since for any law π with no atom on (0,∞)
we have by symmetry that V 1π,π = (1− π({0})2)/2 + θπ({0})2.
5. Preliminaries. In the previous section, we characterised the symmet-
ric Nash equilibria. In this section, we state and prove some auxiliary results
which will be required for proofs of existence and uniqueness in later sec-
tions. The first result is of independent interest. Note that Fν∗ is a concave
function on [0,∞), but the case we will want in the following theorem is for
convex distribution functions.
Proposition 5.1. Fix y ∈ (0,∞). Let P(y) ⊆ P be the set of proba-
bility measures π on R+ with mean π = y. For π ∈ P, recall that Fπ is
the distribution function of π, and extend this definition to (−∞,∞). Let
aπ = inf{u :Fπ(u)> 0} ≥ 0 and bπ = sup{u :Fπ(u)< 1} ≤∞.
(i) Let Pcx(y) = {π ∈P(y) :Fπ is convex on (−∞, bπ]}. Then, for π ∈Pcx(y),
π({0}) = 0. Moreover:
(a) suppose H is convex; then,
sup
π∈Pcx(y)
∫
π(dz)H(z) =
∫ 2y
0
1
2y
H(v)dv;
(b) suppose H is concave; then, supπ∈Pcx(y)
∫
π(dz)H(z) =H(y).
(ii) Let Pcv(y) = {π ∈P(y) :Fπ is concave on [0,∞)}. Then, for π ∈Pcv(y),
aπ = 0. Moreover:
(a) suppose H is convex; then, supπ∈Pcv(y)
∫
π(dz)H(z) = H(0) +
y limx↑∞
H(x)
x ;
(b) suppose H is concave; then
sup
π∈Pcv(y)
∫
π(dz)H(z) =
∫ 2y
0
1
2y
H(v)dv.
The suprema in (i)(a) and (ii)(b) are attained by π ∼U [0,2y]. The supre-
mum in (i)(b) is attained by π ∼ δy. The suprema in (i)(b) and (ii)(a) are
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valid for all distributions on R+ with mean y and not just those with convex
(or concave) distribution functions.
Remark 5.1. This result is stated for completeness; the result we will
use and prove is (i)(a).
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Let U be a U [0,1] random variable.
Suppose π ∈ Pcx(y) and let Y have law π. It is obvious that F = Fπ,
is strictly increasing on (aπ, bπ), and F (aπ) = 0. Hence, the inverse func-
tion G , F−1 exists on [0,1]. Since G(U) is distributed as Y , E[H(Y )] =
E[H(G(U))] =
∫ 1
0 H(G(u))du and
∫ 1
0 G(u)du= E[G(U)] = E[Y ] = y.
It is clear that G is concave on [0,1] and G(0) = aπ ≥ 0. Since
∫ 1
0 2yudu=∫ 1
0 G(u)du, then either G(u) = 2yu and Y ∼ 2yU , or there exists a unique
u∗ ∈ (0,1) such that G(u∗) = 2yu∗ (see Figure 1). In the latter case, 2yu≤
G(u) ≤ 2yu∗ for u ∈ [0, u∗] and 2yu∗ ≤ G(u) ≤ 2yu for u ∈ [u∗,1]. Then if
D , E[H(Y )]− E[H(2yU)] we have
D=
∫ u∗
0
(H(G(u))−H(2yu))du+
∫ 1
u∗
(H(G(u))−H(2yu))du.
Let H ′− denote the left derivative of the convex function H . Then H(u2)−
H(u1)≤ (u2−u1)H ′−(u2) for any u1 and u2, and setting u1 = 2yu and u2 =
G(u) and using the fact that H ′− is increasing,
D ≤
∫ u∗
0
(G(u)− 2yu)H ′−(G(u)) du+
∫ 1
u∗
(G(u)− 2yu)H ′−(G(u))du
≤H ′−(2yu∗)
∫ 1
0
(G(u)− 2yu)du= 0.
Fig. 1. Comparison of G(u) and 2yu. Since G is the inverse of the CDF of a ran-
dom variable with mean y, the area under G is y. Then the areas under G and the line
ℓ(u) = 2yu are the same. Hence, if G is concave on [0,1] (and not a straight line passing
through the origin), there is a unique crossing point u∗ of G and the line ℓ.
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Thus, E[H(Y )] ≤ E[H(2yU)] = ∫ 2y0 12yH(u)du. Moreover, it is obvious that
the bound is attained by Y ∼ U [0,2y]. 
Proposition 5.2. Suppose that H is such that H is twice differentiable
and h=H ′ is concave. Suppose that H(0) = 0, h(0)> 0, h′(0)≤ 0 and h is
not constant. Then, for wˆ > 0 such that H(wˆ) = 0, we have h(wˆ)+h(0)≤ 0,
that is, |h(wˆ)| ≥ h(0).
Proof. Since h is not constant and h is concave, there is a solution
w = w˜ say, to h(w) =−h(0). Let δ =−2h(0)/w˜ be the slope of the line join-
ing (0, h(0)) to (w˜,−h(0)). Then, on (0, w˜), h(w) ≥ h(0) + δw and H(w) =∫ w
0 h(x)dx≥ h(0)w+δw2/2, so that H(w˜)≥ 0. Then, by concavity of H and
since H(wˆ) = 0, wˆ ≥ w˜. Thus, h(wˆ)≤ h(w˜) =−h(0) and the result follows.

Proposition 5.3. For any measure ν ∈A∗µ, if Cν(x) =Cµ(x) for some
x > 0, then Cµ(·) is differentiable at x and C ′ν(x) =C ′µ(x).
Proof. Suppose that ν ∈A∗µ. Then Cν is continuously differentiable on
(0,∞) and Cν ≥Cµ. Since Cν(y)−Cµ(y)≥ 0 =Cν(x)−Cµ(x) for any y < x,
we deduce C ′ν(x−)−C ′µ(x−)≤ 0. Similarly, we have C ′ν(x+)−C ′µ(x+)≥ 0.
Thus, C ′µ(x+) ≤ C ′ν(x+) = C ′ν(x−) ≤ C ′µ(x−). Conversely, convexity of Cµ
implies C ′µ(x−) ≤ C ′µ(x+), and hence C ′µ(x−) = C ′µ(x+), and the results
follow. 
Proposition 5.4. Fix any measure ν ∈A∗µ. Suppose that Cν(x) = φ(x)
on some interval J = [j1, j2), where 0 ≤ j1 < j2 ≤ ∞ and where φ(·) is
a quadratic function defined on (−∞,∞) with φ′′ > 0. Then j2 <∞ and
Cν(x)≤ φ(x) on [j2,∞).
Proof. Assume that j2 =∞. Then Cν is quadratic on [j1,∞) with
strictly positive quadratic coefficient. This means that Cν is not ultimately
decreasing, which is a contradiction. Thus, j2 <∞. Since C ′ν is continuous
and concave on (0,∞) and since φ′ is linear, it is clear that Cν(x)≤ φ(x) on
[j2,∞). 
6. Existence of a Nash equilibrium.
6.1. Atomic initial measure. We start with the case where the initial
law µ is an atomic probability measure. We will construct a put func-
tion Q(x) that satisfies certain conditions, and then define a measure ν
via ν((−∞, x]) =Q′(x). It will then follow that ν belongs to A∗µ
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We state the theorem for the case of a measure χ as we will need the
more general result in subsequent sections. In the case of X0 ∼ µ, where µ is
a purely atomic probability measure with finitely many atoms, the theorem
gives existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6.1. Suppose χ ∈M consists of finitely many atoms, that is,
χ=
∑N
j=1 pjδξj , where 0≤ ξ1 < ξ2 < · · ·< ξN and pj > 0 for all 1≤ j ≤N .
Then A∗χ is nonempty.
Proof. If χ is a point mass at zero, then set π({0}) = χ({0}). Then
π ∈A∗χ and the construction is complete.
Otherwise, set Q1(r, y) = yFχ(0)+ry
2/2. Then there exists a unique value
of r (r1 say) such that
Q1(r1, y)≥ Pχ(y) ∀y ≥ 0 and
Q1(r1, y) = Pχ(y) for some y > 0.
Let y1 =max{y > 0 :Q1(r1, y) = Pχ(y)}. That y1 is finite is one of the con-
clusions of Proposition 5.4, but also follows from the fact that Q1(r1, ·) is
quadratic, whereas Pχ(·) is ultimately linear. Then necessarily P ′χ(y1) ex-
ists and ∂∂yQ1(r1, y1) = P
′
χ(y1) (see the proof of Proposition 5.3). Note that
y1 /∈ {ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξN} since P ′χ has a kink at these points. Set ξ0 = 0 and
ξN+1 =∞ and let n1 be such that ξn1 < y1 < ξn1+1. If n1 =N [equivalently
P ′χ(y1) =
∑N
j=1 pj = χ(R
+)] then stop. Otherwise, we proceed inductively.
Let y0 = 0. Suppose we have found 0 < y1 < y2 < · · · < yk < ξN (yi /∈
{ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξN} ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k) and Q(·) on [0, yk] such that (i) Q is continu-
ously differentiable, (ii) Q(yi) = Pχ(yi) and Q
′(yi) = P ′χ(yi) for any 1≤ i < k,
(iii) Q(yk) = Pχ(yk) and Q
′(yk−) = P ′χ(yk) and (iv) Q′′ is defined everywhere
except at the points 0, y1, y2, . . . , yk and is piecewise constant and decreas-
ing. In particular, Q is quadratic on {(yi−1, yi)}1≤i≤k with representation
Q(y) =Qi(ri, y) for y ∈ [yi−1, yi] where
Qi(ri, y), Pχ(yi−1) + (y − yi−1)P ′χ(yi−1) + 12ri(y − yi−1)2,
and where (ri)1≤i≤k is a strictly decreasing sequence. Let Qk+1(r, y) = Pχ(yk)+
(y − yk)P ′χ(yk) + 12r(y − yk)2; then there exists a unique r (rk+1 say) such
that
Qk+1(rk+1, y)≥ Pχ(y) ∀y ≥ yk
and
Qk+1(rk+1, y) = Pχ(y) for some y > yk.
See Figure 2. Since Qk(rk, y) > Pχ(y) for all y > yk, it is clear that 0 <
rk+1 < rk. Set yk+1 = max{y > yk :Qk+1(rk+1, y) = Pχ(y)}. Then P ′χ(yk+1)
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Fig. 2. The construction of Q(y). The piecewise linear curve is Pχ(y). The func-
tions Q3(·, y) are quadratic functions of y on [y2,∞) such that Q3(·, y2) = Pχ(y2) and
∂
∂y
Q3(·, y2) = P
′
χ(y2). Then r3 is the unique value of r such that Q3(r3, y)≥ Pχ(y) for all
y ≥ y2 and Q3(r3, y) = Pχ(y) for some y > y2. The dashed curve is Q3(r, y) with r < r3.
exists, P ′χ(yk+1) =
∂
∂yQk+1(rk+1, yk+1), and yk+1 /∈ {ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξN} since Pχ
has changes in slope at these points. Set Q(y) =Qk+1(rk+1, y) on [yk, yk+1].
We repeat the construction up to and including the index k = T − 1 for
which yk+1 > ξN . Then yT−1 < ξN < yT . Finally, we set Q(y) = Pχ(y) =
χ(R+)y − χ for y ≥ yT .
For y > 0, let ρ(y) = Q′′(y). Then ρ is defined almost everywhere and
ρ(y) = ri on (yi−1, yi)1≤i≤T and ρ(y) = 0 on (yT ,∞). Furthermore, ρ is de-
creasing and ρ only decreases at points where Pχ(y) =Q(y). Let π be the
measure with an atom at 0 of size Fχ(0) and density ρ on (0,∞), and re-
call that yT > ξN . Then Fπ(0) = Fχ(0); for any y ≥ yT , Fπ(y) = P ′π(yT ) =
P ′χ(yT ) = χ(R+) and π =
∫∞
0 yπ(dy) = yTFπ(yT ) − Pπ(yT ) = yTFχ(yT ) −
Pχ(yT ) = χ. Furthermore, Pπ(y) = Q(y) ≥ Pχ(y). It follows that π ∈ A∗χ.

Remark 6.1. Fix any k ∈ {1,2, . . . , T}. Let nk be such that ξnk < yk <
ξnk+1. Then, in the mapping χ 7→ π, the atoms (ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξnk) of χ are
mapped to [0, yk], and π([0, yk]) = P
′
χ(yk) =
∑nk
j=1 pj . Moreover,
∫ yk
0 yπ(dy) =
ykFπ(yk)−Pπ(yk) = yk
∑nk
j=1 pj −Pχ(yk) = yk
∑nk
j=1 pj −
∑nk
j=1 pj(yk − ξj) =∑nk
j=1 pjξj .
Example 6.1. Suppose that χ = pδξ with ξ > 0. Then Pχ(y) = p(y −
ξ)+. Let Q1(r, y) = ry
2/2. Then, Q1(r, y)≥ Pχ(y) if and only if r ≥ p/(2ξ),
r1, and for r = r1 we have Q1(r1, y) ≥ Pχ(y) with equality at y = 0 and
y = y1 = 2ξ. Then y1 > ξ so that the construction ends and π = pU [0,2ξ].
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The rest of this subsection is devoted to the proof of a useful proposition
which will be used in the next subsection to find the optimal target law for
a general initial measure.
For ̟ ∈M, let X̟ be a random variable with law ̟. Denote by ˘̟ the
law of a random variable X˘̟ where conditional on X̟ = x, X˘̟ has law
̺x = U [0,2x].
Lemma 6.1. For x≥ 0, and ̟ ∈M,
F ˘̟ (x) = F̟(x/2) +
∫
(x/2,∞)
̟(dy)
x
2y
;
(9)
P ˘̟ (x) =
∫ ∞
x/2
P̟(u)
x2
2u3
du.
Proof. We prove the second result. We have
P ˘̟ (x) = xF̟(0) +
∫
(0,∞)
̟(du)
∫ 2u
0
(x− z)+
2u
dz
= xF̟(0) +
∫
(0,x/2)
(x− u)̟(du) +
∫
[x/2,∞)
x2
4u
̟(du),
and integrating by parts we find
P ˘̟ (x) =
∫
(0,x/2)
F̟(u)du+
∫
[x/2,∞)
F̟(u)
x2
4u2
du.
The result follows from a further integration by parts. 
Corollary 6.1. If π cx ̟, then π˘ cx ˘̟ .
Proposition 6.1. Suppose µ ∈M consists of finitely many atoms. De-
note by ν the element of A∗µ which is constructed using the algorithm in
Theorem 6.1. Suppose ̟ is any measure such that ̟ has mass µ(R+), mean
µ and µcx ̟. Then ν cx ˘̟ .
Proof. By Corollary 6.1, it is sufficient to prove the proposition in the
case ̟= µ.
Suppose µ =
∑N
j=1 pjδξj , where 0 ≤ ξ1 < ξ2 < · · · < ξN , pi > 0 and∑N
j=1 pjξj = µ. By construction, µ˘=
∑N
j=1 pjU [0,2ξj ] where U [0,0] can more
simply be written as δ0.
For any m ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N}, define µm =∑mj=1 pjδξj and suppose νm is the
corresponding measure derived using the algorithm in Theorem 6.1.
If N = 1, then µ= p1δξ1 and ν = p1U [0,2ξ1] = µ˘ and the result holds.
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Now suppose that N ≥ 2. Then ν = νN =∑N−1m=1(νm+1 − νm) + ν1. Note
that µm+1 − µm ∼ pm+1δξm+1 and hence νm+1 − νm has mass pm+1 and
mean ξm+1. Provided we can show that (ν
m+1 − νm) has a nondecreas-
ing density, then it follows from Proposition 5.1 that (νm+1 − νm) cx
pm+1U [0,2ξm+1]. Then, since convex order is preserved under addition, if
(νm+1 − νm) has a nondecreasing density for every m with 1≤m≤N − 1,
then ν cx
∑N
m=1 pmU [0,2ξm] = µ˘.
We use a suffix m to label quantities constructed in Theorem 6.1, to show
that they are constructed from measure µm. The idea of the proof is that
in calculating νm and νm+1 using the algorithm of Theorem 6.1, the early
parts of the construction will be the same, and indeed νm and νm+1 will
differ only over the final nonzero element of νm+1.
Fix m with 1 ≤ m ≤ N . Define Bm ⊆ {1,2, . . . , Tm} by Bm = {k :
Qmk (r
m
k , y)≥ Pµm+1(y) on (ymk−1,∞)}.
Case (a). Bm = {1,2, . . . , Tm}.
Then (Qmj (r
m
j , y), y
m
j )1≤j≤Tm and (Q
m+1
j (r
m+1
j , y), y
m+1
j )1≤j≤Tm are the
same. Then also Tm+1 = Tm+1, ymTm < y
m+1
Tm+1
and the densities ρm+1 and ρm
satisfy that ρm+1 = ρm on the interval (0, ymTm = y
m+1
Tm ), ρ
m+1 is constant on
(ym+1Tm , y
m+1
Tm+1
) and ρm is zero on (ym+1Tm , y
m+1
Tm+1
). In particular, νm+1 − νm =
pm+1U [ym+1Tm , ym+1Tm ]cx pm+1U [0,2ξm+1].
Case (b). inf{k :k /∈ Bm}= Tm.
Then it must be that in the construction we have Tm = Tm+1, ρm+1 = ρm
on the interval (0, ymTm−1 ≡ ym+1Tm−1), ρm+1 is constant (with value denoted
by rm+1
Tm+1
say) on (ym+1Tm−1, y
m+1
Tm+1
), and ρm is constant and strictly less than
rm+1
Tm+1
on (ym+1Tm−1, y
m
Tm), ρ
m is zero on (ymTm ,∞). We want to argue that ymTm <
ym+1Tm , which then implies that (ρ
m+1 − ρm) is nondecreasing on (0, ym+1Tm ).
See case (b) of Figure 3.
Note that in the construction of νm the masses at points (ξnm
Tm−1+1
, . . . , ξm)
are embedded in the interval (ymTm−1, y
m
Tm), and in the construction of ν
m+1
the masses at points (ξnm
Tm−1
+1, . . . , ξm+1) are embedded in (y
m
Tm−1, y
m+1
Tm ).
Moreover, νm has constant density over (ymTm−1, y
m
Tm) and ν
m+1 has con-
stant density over (ymTm−1, y
m+1
Tm ). Consider the means of ν
m and νm+1; by
Remark 6.1, we have
1
2
(ymTm−1 + y
m
Tm)
m∑
j=nm
Tm−1+1
pj =
m∑
j=nm
Tm−1+1
pjξj
and
1
2
(ymTm−1 + y
m+1
Tm )
m+1∑
j=nm
Tm−1+1
pj =
m+1∑
j=nm
Tm−1+1
pjξj.
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Fig. 3. Graph of the decreasing, piecewise constant functions ρm(y) and ρm+1(y). Ob-
serve that ρm ≤ ρm+1 and (ρm+1 − ρm) is nondecreasing on (0, ym+1
Tm+1
). The three cases
correspond to the three cases in the proof. In case (c) the density ρ˜m+1 is also shown.
Hence,
ymTm − ymTm−1 =
2
∑m
j=nm
Tm−1
+1 pj(ξj − ymTm−1)∑m
j=nm
Tm−1
+1 pj
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<
2
∑m+1
j=nm
Tm−1
+1 pj(ξj − ymTm−1)∑m+1
j=nm
Tm−1
+1 pj
= ym+1Tm − ymTm−1
and then ymTm < y
m+1
Tm .
Case (c). inf{k :k /∈ Bm}< Tm.
Define kˆ , inf{k :k /∈ Bm}. Then it must be that in the construction we
have Tm+1 = kˆ, ρm+1 = ρm on the interval (0, ym
kˆ−1 ≡ y
m+1
kˆ−1 ), ρ
m+1 is con-
stant (with value denoted by rm+1
Tm+1
say) on (ym+1
kˆ−1 , y
m+1
Tm+1
), ρm is decreasing
and strictly less than rm+1
Tm+1
on (ym+1
kˆ−1 , y
m
Tm) and ρ
m is zero on (ymTm ,∞). Sim-
ilarly to case (b), we want to argue that ymTm < y
m+1
Tm+1
, which then implies
that (ρm+1 − ρm) is zero on (0, ym
kˆ−1) and nondecreasing on (y
m
kˆ−1, y
m+1
Tm+1
).
See case (c) of Figure 3.
We first construct a new measure ν˜m+1. Define Q˜m+1 on [0, ymTm−1] by
Q˜m+1(y) =Qm(y) = Pνm(y). Let L
m+1 be the line Lm+1(y) =
∑m+1
j=1 pj(y −
ξj) so that Pµm+1(y) =max{Pµm(y),Lm+1(y)} and for y ≥ ymTm−1 define
Q˜m+1Tm (r, y), Pµm(y
m
Tm−1) + (y − ymTm−1)P ′µm(ymTm−1) + 12r(y− ymTm−1)2.
Then there exists a unique r (denoted by r˜m+1 say) such that
Q˜m+1Tm (r˜
m+1, y)≥ Lm+1(y) ∀y ≥ ymTm−1
and
Q˜m+1Tm (r˜
m+1, y) = Lm+1(y) for some y > y
m
Tm−1.
Note that in the construction of ν˜m+1 (unlike in the construction of νm
or νm+1) there is no requirement that r˜m+1 ≤ rmTm−1. Let y˜m+1 be the
point such that Q˜m+1Tm (r˜
m+1, y˜m+1) =Lm+1(y˜
m+1). Then y˜m+1 > ymTm−1 and
∂
∂y Q˜
m+1
Tm (r˜
m+1, y˜m+1) = L′m+1(y˜
m+1) =
∑m+1
j=1 pj . Now let Q˜
m+1(·) be given
by (see Figure 4)
Q˜m+1(y) = Pνm(y) · 1[0,ym
Tm−1)
+ Q˜m+1Tm (r˜
m+1, y) · 1[ym
Tm−1
,y˜m+1)
+Lm+1(y) · 1[y˜m+1,∞).
Let ρ˜m+1 = (Q˜m+1)′′, and let ν˜m+1 be the measure with density ρ˜m+1 on
(0,∞) and an atom at 0 of size Fµ(0). Then Pν˜m+1(y) = Q˜m+1(y), and for
y ≥ y˜m+1 we have Fν˜m+1(y) =L′m+1(y˜m+1) =
∑m+1
j=1 pj and
∫∞
0 yν˜
m+1(dy) =
y˜m+1Fν˜m+1(y˜
m+1)−Pν˜m+1(y˜m+1) =
∑m+1
j=1 pjξj . In particular, ν˜
m+1 has the
same mass and first moment as µm+1, and hence as νm+1.
The point about the intermediate measure ν˜m+1 is that as in case (b)
the masses at points (ξnm
Tm−1
+1, . . . , ξm+1) are embedded in the interval
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Fig. 4. Graph of Q˜m+1(y). The dashed curve Q˜m+1Tm (r˜
m+1, y) is a quadratic function of
y over the interval [ymTm−1, y˜
m+1].
(ymTm−1, y˜
m+1). In particular, νm has constant density over (ymTm−1, y
m
Tm) and
ν˜m+1 has constant density over (ymTm−1, y˜
m+1). Then, exactly as in the proof
of case (b), considering the means of νm and ν˜m+1, we have ymTm < y˜
m+1.
Next, we wish to compare the supports of ν˜m+1 and νm+1. Recall that
ν˜m+1(R+) = νm+1(R+) =
∑m+1
j=1 pj and ν˜
m+1 and νm+1 have the same mean.
Moreover, Fνm+1(y) = Fνm(y) = Fν˜m+1(y) on [0, y
m
kˆ−1], and Fνm+1(y) >
Fνm(y) = Fν˜m+1(y) on (y
m
kˆ−1, y
m
Tm−1]. This implies that y˜
m+1 < ym+1
Tm+1
since
the means of ν˜m+1 and νm+1 are the same [and hence the area between
Fνm+1 and the horizontal line at height ν
m+1(R+) is equal to the area be-
tween Fν˜m+1 and the same horizontal line (see Figure 5)]. Hence, y
m
Tm <
y˜m+1 < ym+1
Tm+1
and we find that (ρm+1− ρm) is nondecreasing on (0, ym+1
Tm+1
),
and (νm+1−νm) is a positive measure with increasing density on its support.
Hence, νm+1 − νm cx pm+1U [0,2ξm+1]. 
6.2. General initial measure. Our first result shows that if µ is a general
measure in M then A∗µ is nonempty, and hence a symmetric Nash equilib-
rium exists.
Theorem 6.2. Suppose µ ∈M. Then A∗µ is nonempty.
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Fig. 5. Graph of Fνm+1 , Fνm and Fν˜m+1 in the case kˆ < T
m. By the construc-
tions, Fνm+1(y) = Fνm (y) = Fν˜m+1(y) on [0, y
m+1
kˆ−1
], Fνm+1(y) > Fνm (y) = Fν˜m+1(y) on
(ym+1
kˆ−1
, ymTm−1] and Fν˜m+1 is linear on (y
m
Tm−1, y˜
m+1). Since Fνm+1 and Fν˜m+1 have the
same mean, the area between the horizontal line at ν˜m+1(R) and Fνm+1 must be equal to
the area between the line at ν˜m+1(R) and Fν˜m+1 . Hence, y˜
m+1 < ym+1
Tm+1
.
Proof. Let {µn}n≥1 be a sequence of atomic probability measures with
finite support such that Fµn(0) = Fµ(0), µn has total mass µ(R
+) and mean
µ and µn ↑ µ in convex order. Theorem 6.1 implies that for every n, there
exists νn ∈A∗µn . Define Dn : [0,∞) 7→ [0, µ(R+)] by
Dn(x) =−C ′νn(x) = µ(R+)−Fνn(x)
and let bn = sup{x :Fνn(x) < µ(R+)}. From the construction of νn in the
proof of Theorem 6.1 it can be seen that bn is finite. Thus,Dn is a decreasing,
convex function with Dn(0) = µ(R
+)−Fµ(0), Dn(bn) = 0, Dn ≥ 0 and∫ ∞
0
Dn(x)dx=
∫ bn
0
Dn(x)dx=
∫ bn
0
xνn(dx) = νn = µn = µ.(10)
Helly’s Theorem [see Helly (1912) or Filipo´w et al. (2012), Theorem
1.3] states that if {fn}n≥1 is a uniformly bounded sequence of monotone
real-valued functions defined on R then there is a subsequence {fnk}k≥1
which is pointwise convergent. Hence, there exists a convergent subsequence
of {Dn}n≥1 and moving to a subsequence as necessary, we may assume
{Dn}n≥1 is pointwise convergent. Let D∞ denote the limit function. Since
Dn is decreasing and convex for any n≥ 1, D∞ is also decreasing and convex.
Moreover, by Fatou’s lemma and (10),∫ ∞
0
D∞(x)dx=
∫ ∞
0
lim inf
n→∞ Dn(x)dx≤ lim infn→∞
∫ ∞
0
Dn(x)dx= µ.
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In particular, since D∞ is decreasing and
∫∞
0 D∞(x)dx <∞, we must have
limx↑∞D∞(x) = 0.
Define a measure ν via ν((−∞, x]) = µ(R+) − D∞(x). It is clear that
ν(R+) = µ(R+), Fν(0) = Fµ(0), Fν(x) is continuous and ν has a nonincreas-
ing density ρ. Moreover, νn converges in distribution to ν.
We wish to show that ν has mean µ. Note that νn cx µ˘n (Proposition 6.1
applied to µn) and µn cx µ from which it follows that νn cx µ˘. Hence,
elements νn in the sequence have a uniform bound (in the sense of convex
order) and it follows that the sequence is uniformly integrable and µ =
limn νn = ν.
Since νn converges to ν in distribution, it follows that Pνn(x) converges
pointwise to Pν . Then since νn→ ν it follows that Cνn(x) converges point-
wise to Cν . Hence, Cν(x) = limnCνn(x)≥ limnCµn(x) =Cµ(x).
Suppose Cν(x)>Cµ(x) on some interval J : we show that ν has constant
density on J . It is sufficient to prove the result on every closed subinterval
of J , so we assume J = [a, b]. Then, by continuity of Cν and Cµ, there
exists ε such that Cν(x) ≥ Cµ(x) + ε on J . Let κ = −C ′µ(a+) ≤ µ(R+);
then C ′µ(x+)≥−κ for all x ∈ J . Fix K ∈N such that K > 2(b− a)κ/ε and
set JK = {aj}0≤j≤K where aj = a + (b − a)j/K. Since there is pointwise
convergence, there exists N0 > 0 such that Cνn(x) > Cµ(x) + ε/2 for all
x ∈ JK and all n≥N0. Then, for n≥N0, if aj−1 ≤ x≤ aj ,
Cµ(x)≤ Cµ(aj−1)≤Cµ(aj) + κ(aj − aj−1)<Cµ(aj) + ε/2<Cνn(aj)
≤ Cνn(x).
Finally, Cµn(x) ≤ Cµ(x) everywhere, and we conclude that for sufficiently
large n, Cµn(x)<Cνn(x) on J , and hence Dn(x) is a linear function on J .
It is easy to see that D∞(x) = limn↑∞Dn(x) is also linear on J , and thus ν
has constant density on J as required. Thus, the density of ν only decreases
when Cν(x) =Cµ(x). Hence, ν ∈A∗µ. 
7. Uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. Section 6 shows that set A∗µ is
nonempty. In this section, we prove that |A∗µ| ≤ 1, which thus completes the
proof of Theorem 3.2.
Proposition 7.1. Suppose µ ∈M. Then |A∗µ| ≤ 1.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exists two distinct elements
ν and σ in the set A∗µ. Recall that if Cν(x) > Cµ(x) then Cν is locally a
quadratic function near x, similarly for Cσ . Moreover, both C
′
ν and C
′
σ are
concave.
Observe that, for any x ≥ 0, we cannot have Cν(y) > Cσ(y) for all y ∈
(x,∞): if so then Cν(y)> Cσ(y)≥Cµ(y) on (x,∞) and Cν is quadratic on
(x,∞), which is impossible by Proposition 5.4.
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Let x0 > 0 be such that Cν(x0) 6= Cσ(x0). Without loss of generality,
suppose that Cν(x0)> Cσ(x0). Define x1 = inf{x > x0 :Cν(x) =Cσ(x)}. By
the observation above x1 <∞. Also note that Cν(x) > Cσ(x) for all x ∈
[x0, x1).
Suppose that Cν(x1) =Cσ(x1)>Cµ(x1). Then, near x1,{
Cν(x) =Cν(x1) + βν,1(x− x1) + γν,1(x− x1)2,
Cσ(x) =Cσ(x1) + βσ,1(x− x1) + γσ,1(x− x1)2,
for some constants βν,1 < 0, βσ,1 < 0, γν,1 > 0 and γσ,1 > 0. Since Cν(x) >
Cσ(x) to the left of x1, it is clear that βν,1 ≤ βσ,1.
Assume that βν,1 = βσ,1. Then since Cν(x) > Cσ(x) on [x0, x1), we have
γν,1 > γσ,1. Let xˆν,1 = inf{x > x1 :Cν(x) = Cµ(x)}, then Cν(x) = Cν(x1) +
βν,1(x − x1) + γν,1(x − x1)2 on [x1, xˆν,1] and xˆν,1 <∞ by Proposition 5.4.
Further, by Proposition 5.4, Cσ(x) ≤ Cσ(x1) + βσ,1(x− x1) + γσ,1(x− x1)2
on (x1,∞). Thus, Cσ(xˆν,1)< Cν(xˆν,1) = Cµ(xˆν,1), which is a contradiction.
Hence, βν,1 < βσ,1 < 0. Now let xˆσ,1 = inf{x > x1 :Cσ(x) = Cµ(x)} <∞ (by
Proposition 5.4). If γν,1 ≤ γσ,1 then Cν(xˆσ,1)<Cσ(xˆσ,1) =Cµ(xˆσ,1), which is
a contradiction. So we conclude that βν,1 < βσ,1 < 0 and γν,1 > γσ,1 > 0. Set
ϑ= βσ,1 − βν,1 > 0.
Now we introduce a useful lemma.
Lemma 7.1. Suppose ν and σ are distinct elements of A∗µ. Suppose xk
is such that Cν(xk) =Cσ(xk)>Cµ(xk). Then xk > 0 and in a neighbourhood
of xk we can write{
Cν(x) =Cν(xk) + βν,k(x− xk) + γν,k(x− xk)2,
Cσ(x) =Cσ(xk) + βσ,k(x− xk) + γσ,k(x− xk)2.
Suppose βν,k 6= βσ,k. Then there is an interval to the left of xk on which
Cν(x) − Cσ(x) is either strictly positive or strictly negative. Suppose that
Cν(x)−Cσ(x)> 0 on some interval (xk− ε,xk): if not then interchange the
roles of ν and σ. Then βν,k < βσ,k < 0 and γν,k > γσ,k > 0.
Define xk+1 = sup{x < xk :Cν(x) = Cσ(x)}. Then, 0 < xk+1 < xk,
Cν(xk+1) = Cσ(xk+1) > Cµ(xk+1), and hence in a neighbourhood of xk+1
we can write{
Cν(x) =Cν(xk+1) + βν,k+1(x− xk+1) + γν,k+1(x− xk+1)2,
Cσ(x) =Cσ(xk+1) + βσ,k+1(x− xk+1) + γσ,k+1(x− xk+1)2.(11)
Further, βσ,k+1 < βν,k+1 < 0, γσ,k+1 > γν,k+1 > 0 and βν,k+1−βσ,k+1 > βσ,k−
βν,k > 0.
Proof. Exactly as in the case k = 1 from the proof of Proposition 7.1,
we conclude that βν,k < βσ,k < 0 and γν,k > γσ,k > 0.
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Assume that Cν(xk+1) = Cσ(xk+1) = Cµ(xk+1). If xk+1 = 0, then
C ′ν(xk+1) = Fµ(0) − µ(R+) = C ′σ(xk+1). Otherwise, if xk+1 > 0 then
C ′ν(xk+1) = C ′σ(xk+1) by Proposition 5.3. In either case, since Cν(x) >
Cσ(x)≥Cµ(x) on (xk+1, xk), C ′ν is linear on [xk+1, xk]. Then because βσ,k =
C ′σ(xk)>C ′ν(xk) = βν,k and C ′σ is concave, it is clear that C ′σ(x)≥C ′ν(x) on
(xk+1, xk). This contradicts the fact that Cσ(·) =Cν(·) at both xk and xk+1.
Hence, Cν(xk+1) =Cσ(xk+1)>Cµ(xk+1).
It then follows that xk+1 ∈ (0, xk) and both Cν and Cσ are quadratic in
a neighbourhood of xk+1. In particular, Cν is quadratic on (xk+1, xk) and
γν,k = γν,k+1. Using a similar argument to that described in the case k = 1,
we get that βσ,k+1 < βν,k+1 < 0 and γσ,k+1 > γν,k+1 > 0.
Denote by ρν the density function of the measure ν. Then ρν is constant on
(xk+1, xk). In contrast, ρσ is nonincreasing, ρσ(xk) = 2γσ,k < 2γν,k = ρν(xk)
and ρσ(xk+1) = 2γσ,k+1 > 2γν,k+1 = ρν(xk+1). Set yk = sup{y < xk :ρσ(y)≥
ρν(y)}, then yk ∈ (xk+1, xk). Further, R(x) , Cν(x) − Cσ(x) defined on
[xk+1, xk] is zero at the endpoints, has nondecreasing second derivative and
is concave on [xk+1, yk] and strictly convex on [yk, xk] (see Figure 6).
Let zk ∈ (xk+1, yk) be the unique value such that R(zk) = R(yk). Then
R′(xk+1) ≥ R′(zk) > 0 and R′(yk) < R′(xk) ≤ 0. Set H(x) = R(yk − x) −
R(yk) on [0, yk−zk]. Then using Proposition 5.2, we obtain R′(zk)≥ |R′(yk)|.
Hence, βν,k+1 − βσ,k+1 = R′(xk+1) ≥ R′(zk) ≥ |R′(yk)| > |R′(xk)| = βσ,k −
βν,k > 0. 
Return to the proof of Proposition 7.1. Using Lemma 7.1, we construct
a decreasing sequence of points (xk)k≥1 at which Cν − Cσ changes sign.
Moreover, |C ′ν(xk) − C ′σ(xk)| = |βν,k − βσ,k| ≥ ϑ. Let x∞ = limk↑∞ xk then
x∞ ≥ 0. Observe that limk↑∞(βν,k − βσ,k) =C ′ν(x∞)−C ′σ(x∞) exists. How-
ever, lim supk↑∞(βν,k − βσ,k) ≥ ϑ > 0 and lim infk↑∞(βν,k − βσ,k) ≤ −ϑ < 0,
Fig. 6. Graph of R(x). Since R′′(x) = ρν(x) − ρσ(x) is nondecreasing on (xk+1, xk)
and R′′(yk) = 0, R is concave on [xk+1, yk] and strictly convex on [yk, xk]. Since
R′(x) =C′ν(x)−C
′
σ(x), R
′(xk+1) = βν,k+1−βσ,k+1 > 0 and R
′(xk) = βν,k−βσ,k < 0. Then
R′(yk) < R
′(xk) < 0, and there exists a unique zk ∈ (xk+1, yk) such that R(zk) = R(yk).
Further, R′(xk+1)≥R
′(zk)> 0.
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which is a contradiction. Hence, there cannot be distinct elements ν and σ
in set A∗µ.
The above is predicated on the assumption that Cν(x1) =Cσ(x1)>Cµ(x1).
Now suppose Cν(x1) =Cσ(x1) =Cµ(x1). Recall that Cν >Cσ on an interval
to the left of x1. Let x2 = sup{x < x1 :Cν(x) =Cσ(x)}. Then x2 ∈ [0, x0) and
Cν(x)>Cσ(x) on (x2, x1).
Assume that Cν(x2) = Cσ(x2) = Cµ(x2). Then, by Proposition 5.3,
C ′ν(x1) = C ′σ(x1) and C ′ν(x2) = C ′σ(x2). Since C ′ν is linear and C ′σ is con-
cave on (x2, x1), it follows that C
′
ν(x)≤C ′σ(x) for all x ∈ [x2, x1], which is a
contradiction. Hence, Cν(x2) =Cσ(x2)>Cµ(x2).
Now starting the construction at x2, rather than x1, we are in the same
case as discussed previously. In particular, there cannot be distinct elements
ν and σ in set A∗µ. 
APPENDIX: NECESSITY OF CONDITIONS FOR A SYMMETRIC
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Proof of Theorem 2.1. First, we argue that for ν ∈ P to be a sym-
metric Nash equilibrium we must have that ν = µ. Suppose not. Then ν < µ.
Let α be the unique solution of T (·) = 0 where T (x) = Pµ(x) − x + ν.
There are two cases; either Pν(α) = Pµ(α) = α − ν or Pν(α) > Pµ(α). We
consider the second case first; the first case is degenerate and will be treated
subsequently.
So suppose Pν(α) > Pµ(α). Then Pν(x) ≥ x− ν > Pµ(x) on (α,∞) and
ε := infx≥α[Pν(x) − Pµ(x)] > 0. The aim is to construct an interval (γ,β)
and to modify ν by moving the mass of ν in this interval to the right-hand
endpoint, whilst preserving the admissibility property. Then the modified
measure is preferred to ν when playing against an agent with target law ν.
Consider Q(·) defined on x≥ α by Q(x) = Pν(x)− ε. Then Q is nonneg-
ative. Fix β > α and define γ via
γ = arg sup
c<β
{
Q(β)− Pν(c)
β − c
}
, Γ =
Q(β)−Pν(γ)
β − γ .
(Note γ may not be uniquely defined, but Γ is.) Then Fν(γ−)≤ Γ≤ Fν(γ)<
Fν(β−).
Let Pσ be defined by
Pσ(x) =


Pν(x), 0≤ x < γ;
Pν(γ) + (x− γ)Γ, γ ≤ x < β;
Q(x), x≥ β.
If σ is the measure associated with the put price function Pσ then σ ≥ ν
in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, and Pσ ≥ Pµ so that σ is
weakly admissible.
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For any admissible strategy π,
V 1σ,π − V 1ν,π =
∫ ∞
0
π(dx){[(1− Fσ(x)) + θ(Fσ(x)− Fσ(x−))]
− [(1−Fν(x)) + θ(Fν(x)−Fν(x−))]}
= π({γ})(1− θ)[Fν(γ)− Γ]
+
∫
(γ,β)
π(dx){(1− θ)[Fν(x)− Γ] + θ[Fν(x−)− Γ]}
+ π({β})θ(Fν(β−)− Γ)
≥ (1− θ)
{
π({γ})[Fν(γ)− Γ] +
∫
(γ,β)
π(dx)[Fν(x)− Γ]
}
.
Then since ν assigns positive mass to [γ,β) it follows that V 1σ,ν − V 1ν,ν > 0
and (ν, ν) cannot be a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Now consider the degenerate case Pν(α) = α− ν. Then ν has support on
[0, α] and an atom at α and µ assigns positive mass to (α,∞).
Define σ via the put price function Pσ where Pσ(x) = Pν(x) for x≤ α and
Pσ(x) = Pµ(x) for x > α. Note that Pν and Pµ are convex and P
′
σ(α−) =
P ′ν(α−)≤ P ′µ(α−)≤ P ′µ(α+) = P ′σ(α+), and hence Pσ is convex. Then also
σ is admissible and
V 1σ,π − V 1ν,π = π({α})(1− θ)[1− Fµ(α)] +
∫
(α,∞)
π(dx){[1−Fµ(x)]}
+ θ[Fµ(x)− Fµ(x−)]
and V 1σ,ν − V 1ν,ν > ν({α})(1− θ)µ((a,∞))> 0. We conclude in this case also
that (ν, ν) cannot be a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Second, we show that for ν to be a symmetric Nash equilibrium we must
have that ν has no atoms at points above zero. Assume that ν is strongly
admissible and that ν places an atom of size p > 0 at z > 0. We aim to show
that ν cannot correspond to a symmetric Nash equilibrium by considering
the impact of splitting the mass at z into a mass of size q at z − ε1 and a
mass of size p− q at z+ ε2 where q≪ p and ε1≫ ε2, in such a way that the
mean is preserved.
Let the measure σ be given by
Fσ(x) =


Fν(x), if x ∈ [0, z − ε1)∪ [z + ε2,∞),
Fν(x) + q, if x ∈ [z − ε1, z),
Fν(x)− (p− q), if x ∈ [z, z + ε2),
where ε2 ∈ (0, (1−θ)zp1+θp ), ε1 ∈ ( (1+θp)ε2(1−θ)p , z) and q = ε2pε1+ε2 ∈ (0, p). Observe that
(z − ε1)q+ (z + ε2)(p− q) = zp, and hence Fν and Fσ have the same mean.
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Then Cσ(x) =Cν(x) if x ∈ [0, z− ε1)∪ [z+ ε2,∞), Cσ(x) =Cν(x)+ [x− (z−
ε1)]q if x∈ [z−ε1, z), and Cσ(x) =Cν(x)+(z+ε2−x)(p−q) if x ∈ [z, z+ε2).
This implies that Cσ(x)≥Cν(x)≥Cµ(x). Thus, σ is strongly admissible.
Suppose that Player 2 chooses law ν. Then
V 1σ,ν − V 1ν,ν = Fν((z − ε1)−)q+ Fν((z + ε2)−)(p− q)−Fν(z−)p− θp2
+ θν({z − ε1})q+ θν({z + ε2})(p− q)
≥ Fν((z − ε1)−)q+ Fν((z + ε2)−)(p− q)−Fν(z−)p− θp2
= p
{
[Fν((z + ε2)−)−Fν(z−)] ε1
ε1 + ε2
− [Fν(z−)−Fν((z − ε1)−)] ε2
ε1 + ε2
− θp
}
.
Since Fν((z + ε2)−)− Fν(z−)≥ p and 0≤ Fν(z−)−Fν((z − ε1)−)≤ 1,
V 1σ,ν − V 1ν,ν ≥ p
[
ε1
ε1 + ε2
p− ε2
ε1 + ε2
− θp
]
= p
ε1(1− θ)p− (1 + θp)ε2
ε1 + ε2
> 0,
which contradicts the assumption that (ν, ν) is a Nash equilibrium. Thus,
Fν(x) is continuous on (0,∞).
Third, we consider the possibility of an atom at zero. Suppose (ν, ν) is
a symmetric Nash equilibrium and set p = Fν(0) and pµ = Fµ(0). Since ν
must be strongly (and not merely weakly) admissible by the first part of the
theorem, µ cx ν and we must have p ≥ pµ. Suppose that p > pµ; we aim
to derive a contradiction. Fix any q such that 0< q <min{p√1− θ,1− p}.
Since by the arguments above we must have that Fν is continuous on (0,∞),
there exists ε > 0 such that ν((0, ε)) = q, and then Fν(ε) = p+ q. For any
φ ∈ (0,1), let measure σφ be given by
Fσφ(x) =


(1− φ)Fν(x), if x ∈ [0, δ),
φ(p+ q) + (1− φ)Fν(x), if x ∈ [δ, ε),
Fν(x), if x ∈ [ε,∞),
where δ =
∫ ε
0 yν(dy)/(p+q). Then σφ is a probability measure with the same
mean as ν. It follows that
V 1σφ,ν − V 1ν,ν = φ
{
(p+ q)Fν(δ)− θp2−
∫ ε
0
Fν(y)ν(dy)
}
≥ φ{(p+ q)p− θp2− (p+ q)q}= φ{(1− θ)p2− q2}> 0.
Hence, if σφ is strongly admissible then Player 1 would prefer strategy σφ
to ν.
Making q and ε smaller if necessary, and using the fact that C ′ν(0+) =
p − 1 > pµ − 1 = C ′µ(0+), we can insist that Cν(x) − Cµ(x) > (p − pµ)x/2
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for x ∈ (0, ε). Observe that Cν(x) − Cσφ(x) = 0 for x ≥ ε. Moreover, for
x ∈ [0, ε), since Fν(x)−Fσφ(x)≤ φFν(δ), Cν(x)−Cσφ(x)≤ φFν(δ)x. Then,
if φ≤ p−pµ2Fν(δ) , we have
Cσφ(x)−Cµ(x) = (Cν(x)−Cµ(x))− (Cν(x)−Cσφ(x))
> 12 (p− pµ)x− φFν(δ)x≥ 0
for all x∈ (0, ε), and thus µcx σφ. Hence, σφ is admissible for small enough
φ and (ν, ν) cannot be a symmetric Nash equilibrium. It follows that p= pµ
and Fν(0) = Fµ(0). 
Proof of forward implication of Theorem 3.1. We have shown
that if ν is a symmetric Nash equilibrium then ν must be strongly admissible
with respect to µ. It remains to show, first that ν must have a decreasing
density, and second that the density can only decrease at points where the
convex order constraint is binding.
Let (π,π) be a candidate symmetric Nash equilibrium, and suppose π
has the properties given in Theorem 2.1. Suppose that π is such that Fπ is
not concave on (0,∞). Then there exist a, b with 0 < a < b <∞ such that
Fπ(b)− Fπ(a)> 0 and for x ∈ (a, b),
Fπ(x)<Fπ(a) +
x− a
b− a [Fπ(b)−Fπ(a)].
Let σ be such that Fσ(x) = Fπ(x) for x outside [a, b) and for x ∈ [a, b),
Fσ(x) = Fπ(a) + φ[Fπ(b)−Fπ(a)], where φ is chosen so that the means of σ
and π agree. Then
∫ b
a (Fπ(x)−Fπ(a))dx=
∫ b
a (Fσ(x)−Fπ(a))dx= φ[Fπ(b)−
Fπ(a)](b− a) and it follows that φ < 1/2. Then
V 1σ,π − V 1π,π =
∫
[a,b)
Fπ(x)[σ(dx)− π(dx)]
=
∫
[a,b)
(Fπ(x)−Fπ(a))[σ(dx)− π(dx)]
= (1− φ)(Fπ(b)−Fπ(a))2 − (Fπ(x)− Fπ(a))
2
2
∣∣∣∣
b
x=a
=
(
1
2
− φ
)
(Fπ(b)−Fπ(a))2 > 0,
and hence (π,π) cannot be a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Now suppose that ν is strongly admissible, has no atoms on (0,∞) and
Fν is concave on (0,∞). Then the density fν , F ′ν is decreasing. Without
loss of generality we take fν to be right-continuous. Suppose that z is such
that fν(x)> fν(z) for all x < z and that Cν(z) > Cµ(z). Then there exists
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Fig. 7. Plot of the concave function Fν(·). By concavity of Fν we have w > z − ε. If
Fν(w˜) = Fν(z) − {Fν(z + ε)− Fν(z)}, then the area A−(Fν(w˜)) is strictly less than the
area of the triangle which lies above the horizontal line at Fν(w˜), to the left of the vertical
line at z and below the tangent to Fν at z with slope fν(z), as represented by the sloping
line. This area is equal to the area of the triangle delimited by the vertical line at z, the
horizontal line at Fν(z+ ε) and the same tangent to Fν . In turn, this area is less than or
equal to A+. It follows that w < w˜ and v = Fν(w)<Fν(w˜) = 2Fν(z)−Fν(z + ε).
ε ∈ (0, z) such that Cν(z − ε) + 2εC ′ν(z − ε) > Cµ(z + ε) and Cν(z + ε) −
2εC ′ν(z + ε) > Cµ(z − ε), and it follows that if σ is any measure such that
Cσ =Cν outside (z−ε, z+ε) then Cσ(x)>Cµ(x) on the interval [z−ε, z+ε]
and σ is strongly admissible.
Given z and ε as in the previous paragraph, let A+ =
∫ z+ε
z (Fν(z + ε)−
Fν(x))dx and let A−(x) =
∫ Fν(z)
x (z − F−1ν (u))du. Let v solve A−(v) = A+
and set w = F−1ν (v). Note that A−(Fν(z − ε)) ≥ A+ by the concavity of
Fν . Then w ≥ z − ε and v ≥ Fν(0). Note further that A−(Fν(z)− {Fν(z +
ε)−Fν(z)})< fν(z){Fν(z+ε)−Fν(z)}/2≤A+ and, therefore, v < 2Fν(z)−
Fν(z + ε), see Figure 7.
Then by construction,
∫ z+ε
w xν(dx) = z
∫ z+ε
w ν(dx), and if we define σ by
Fσ = Fν outside (w,z + ε) and Fσ(x) = Fν(w) for w < x < z and Fσ(x) =
Fν(z+ε) for z ≤ x < z+ε we have that σ has the same mean as ν. [In effect,
σ replaces the mass of ν on (w,z+ ε) with a point mass at z.] Then, by the
remarks of the previous paragraph, σ is strongly admissible with respect to
µ.
Finally,
V 1σ,ν − V 1ν,ν =
∫
(w,z+ε)
Fν(x)[σ(dx)− ν(dx)]
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= (Fν(z + ε)− v)Fν(z)− Fν(z + ε)
2 − v2
2
=
(Fν(z + ε)− v)
2
[2Fν(z)− v− Fν(z + ε)]> 0
and hence (ν, ν) cannot be a symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
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